We consider the dynamic risk management problem for a commodity processor in a multi-period setting.
Introduction
Controlling the commodity price risk is an important part of managing the business processes for many firms, as an adverse change in prices can greatly impact the firm's profitability and viability (Tevelson et al. 2007 ). To manage the risk from commodity price uncertainty, firms use a variety of operational and financial strategies, including procuring from multiple suppliers and processing 2 Working Paper, Ross School of Business to transform the commodities. The option to transform the commodity is especially pertinent to commodity processors, as the output and input commodity price changes are correlated and provide natural hedges. For instance, Yanglin Soybean Inc., a soybean processing firm in China faced increasing soybean prices, but the effect of the increased input prices was offset to some extent by increased soyoil prices, the output produced by the firm (PR Newswire 2008) . With the growth of commodity exchanges and availability of financial derivatives on commodities, firms can now supplement their operational hedging strategies with financial instruments. However, misplaced hedges on commodities using these financial instruments can also have disastrous effects.
For instance, VeraSun Energy, a bio-fuel company and one of the biggest producers of ethanol, could not take advantage of falling corn prices because of hedges it had entered into at a time when the corn prices were high. A combination of the high input prices and falling ethanol prices, along with other factors led to the company filing for bankruptcy (Mandaro 2008) .
The examples cited above underscore the need for efficient risk management strategies to mitigate the loss in profitability and financial distress caused by adverse commodity price movements. In fact, managers cite the costs of financial distress and high costs of external financing as some of the key drivers for risk management and hedging (Bickel 2006) . And yet there are no agreed upon practical models for risk management (by a firm) in a dynamic context of operational decision making. One approach to model risk aversion and consequently, risk management, treats firms as an entity or individual to whom a utility function can be attributed. However, a corporation's risk preferences are never defined in terms of a corporate utility function and thus, in a normative sense, there is no 'right' corporate utility function to use. An alternate approach to model the risk management problem for firms is to use mean-risk objective functions that represent a tradeoff between the expected value and the cost associated with uncertainty or variability of cash flows.
Perhaps the most well known instance of such objective functions is the mean-variance objective function, where risk is measured by the variance in profits. Another risk measure to quantify risk is the value at risk (VaR), which is popular in the financial industry. However, measures such as variance and VaR have drawbacks (e.g., variance penalizes both under and over performance, while Devalkar, Anupindi, VaR is not sub-additive). Coherent risk measures, such as conditional value at risk (CVaR), have been proposed that overcome these drawbacks.
In a multi-period setting, efficient risk management requires controlling risk in intermediate periods in addition to controlling the risk in total payoffs at the end of the planning horizon. For instance, grain elevators use futures contracts to reduce the risk of falling prices at the time of delivery. However, the increased volatility and near doubling of corn and soybean prices in 2008 led to significant margin calls on these futures positions and put severe pressure on the working capital requirements for many grain elevators (Serres 2008) . Mean-risk objective functions on terminal wealth that ensure the risk in final payoffs are minimized, but do not account for adverse outcomes in intermediate periods in a consistent manner, may not be truly effective when modeling risk averse decisions in a multi-period setting. Such objective functions do not incorporate the timing of uncertainty resolution over the horizon in a consistent manner and can lead to situations where significantly more risky positions are taken in intermediate periods. This aspect of dynamic risk management has not received much attention in the OM literature and we specifically focus on the issue of time consistency in multi-period risk averse decision making in this paper. Specifically, we model the risk averse firm's objective by extending the single period coherent risk measure CVaR to incorporate uncertainty resolution in a consistent manner and control risk over the entire horizon, and not just in the terminal wealth.
We model a commodity processing firm that procures an input commodity from the spot market and processes the commodity to produce an output commodity. At the beginning of each period, the firm decides how much input commodity to procure from the spot market and how much of the total available input to process, subject to capacity constraints on procurement and processing.
The firm uses forward contracts to sell the output commodity and in each period, given the current forward prices, the firm decides the quantity to commit for sale. All forward sale commitments are delivered at the maturity of the forward contract. In addition to operational decisions, the firm also makes financial trading decisions using derivative instruments on the input commodity to manage the commodity risk.
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We model the firm's multi-period risk management problem using a time-consistent risk measure based on the conditional value at risk (CVaR). Broadly speaking, CVaR measures the conditional expectation of the worst case profits, where worst case profits are profits in the left tail of the distribution. However, using CVaR of net present value of total profits does not lead to consistent decisions over time; i.e., optimal policies in the current period may not appear optimal when evaluated in earlier periods (see Section 3 for an example). To overcome this problem and ensure the firm's risk preferences are represented in a consistent manner over the planning horizon, we extend CVaR to dynamic settings using a recursive definition (see Section 4 for details of our objective function). The new objective function is time-consistent in the sense that an optimal policy in the current period will also be optimal when evaluated in earlier periods. Using the time-consistent objective function, we characterize the structure of the optimal operational and financial hedging policy in the presence of capacity constraints and inventory. To summarize our contributions and results, 1. We propose a model to capture risk aversion in a multi-period setting that is time-consistent.
(a) Specifically, we propose a time-consistent variation of the conditional value at risk measure to model risk aversion in a multi-period setting. While the CVaR measure provides a specific illustration, our approach can be used more generally to extend other coherent risk measures in a time-consistent manner.
(b) Using numerical studies, we find that a time-consistent risk measure dominates static risk measures defined on the total profits in a mean-CVaR sense. That is, the mean-CVaR tradeoff achieved using policies for optimizing a time-consistent objective function outperforms the meanCVaR tradeoff achieved using policies for optimizing a static risk measure on the total profits over the horizon.
2. For the proposed time-consistent risk measure, we obtain the optimal operational and financial risk management policy. We show that (a) The optimal procurement and processing decisions are characterized by price dependent 'procure up to' and 'process down to' inventory thresholds. These thresholds are however hard Devalkar, Anupindi, (b) The optimal financial hedging decisions are a function of the ending input inventory levels.
Thus, integration of financial and operational decisions is crucial for effective risk management.
(c) Conditional on the optimal financial trading decisions, the optimal operational decisions can be obtained as the solution to a dynamic programming equation that does not involve the financial decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant OM literature. Section 3 provides an overview of different approaches to model risk averse decision making and describes the issue of time consistency in multi-period settings. Our time-consistent objective function based on CVaR is presented in Section 4, while Section 5 describes the model and analysis of the multi-period integrated risk management problem for a commodity processor. Section 6 illustrates the analytical results using numerical experiments and we conclude in Section 7.
Previous Work
Our paper spans two areas of literature. The first concerns integrated operational and financial risk management. The second pertains to models for risk aversion; we postpone its discussion to the next section, including identifying issues that arise in a dynamic context. A majority of the existing literature related to frameworks of integrated operational and financial risk management (Kleindorfer 2008) deals with integrating long term contracts with short term spot market procurement to manage price and demand uncertainty in single period contexts. Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) review the literature on integrating B2B commodity exchanges in procurement contracts. Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) and Martínez-de Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2006) consider the optimal portfolio of contracts for a buyer who can sign option/capacity reservation contracts with multiple suppliers and also has access to a spot market. In contrast to these papers which consider single period models, we study dynamic decision making in a multi-period setting. Further, risk management Working Paper, Ross School of Business which is an important aspect of decision making in the current paper, is not dealt with in the above literature.
The research on multi-period integrated operational and financial hedging is fairly limited and deals primarily with non-storable commodities. Since decisions across periods are not linked by inventory, the problem can be decomposed into single period problems thus simplifying the analysis.
For instance, Kleindorfer and Li (2005) consider the multi-period risk management problem for a electricity generator using a mean-risk objective, where the risk measure used is the value at risk (VaR). Broadly speaking, VaR is the level of losses that is exceeded only with a small probability, e.g., 1% (or alternately, the value below which profits fall only with a small probability). By decomposing the problem, Kleindorfer and Li show the equivalence of the mean-VaR and meanvariance frontiers. Further, they solve the problem in an open-loop manner, where all decisions are made at the beginning of the horizon. In a dynamic decision making context, Zhu and Kapuscinski (2006) model operational and financial hedging for a risk-averse multinational newsvendor exposed to exchange rate risk, with the newsvendor maximizing an additive exponential utility function on consumption streams. Notably, Zhu and Kapuscinski (2006) do not allow inventory to be carried across periods, with only the financial decisions affecting income across periods.
The papers by Kouvelis et al. (2009) and Geman and Ohana (2008) are the closest to ours in terms of modeling the integrated risk management problem for a storable commodity in a multiperiod context. Kouvelis et al. model the dynamic procurement and financial trading decisions for a firm managing a storable commodity used to satisfy uncertain demand in each period. A critical difference between our paper and Kouvelis et al. (2009) is in terms of how the firm's objective function is modeled. They use a mean-variance objective function, where the objective at the start of each period is the expected profits over the remaining periods minus a multiple of the sum of variances of profits from the current and future periods. This objective function is not necessarily time-consistent and indeed, the authors mention that their choice of the risk averse objective function can lead to inconsistent decisions over time and as a result they cannot use dynamic programming techniques to solve the multi-period problem (see Kouvelis et al. 2009, Devalkar, Anupindi, pg. 12-13). In contrast, we use a time-consistent risk measure to model the risk averse firm's objective function. Fundamentally, time consistency ensures that the objective function represents the firm's underlying preferences in a consistent manner over time and leads to consistent decision making, thus enabling the use of dynamic programming techniques to solve the multi-period risk management problem. While our modeling of the objective function is similar to Geman and Ohana (2008) , they only model trading decisions for a single commodity and their model does not include decisions to irreversibly transform some of the commodities through processing. They do not consider capacity constraints that play a central role in our model and analysis. Finally, in contrast to our paper, Geman and Ohana (2008) neither provide any results for the optimal policy structure nor do they study the interaction of operational and financial decisions.
Modeling Risk Averse Decision Making
Use of utility functions to model risk averse preferences with expected utility as a criteria for decision making is a common approach in economics. The OM literature has often followed a similar approach; see for instance Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) , Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) , Bouakiz and Sobel (1992) . This approach treats firms as an entity or individual to whom a utility function can be attributed. Smith (2004) notes that some of the suggested approaches to model a corporate utility function include using the individual unit manager / decision maker's preferences or have the corporate leaders define a utility function for the firm as a whole, which the employees then adopt.
Finance theorists argue that a firm's management should maximize the benefits of the shareholders of the firm, thereby suggesting that the firm should use the shareholders' utility function. However, it is unlikely that even when acting to benefit the shareholders there will be unanimous agreement between all shareholders, and maximizing shareholders' benefit can at best place limits on the risk preferences that inform the firm's decision, but not yield a utility function for the firm itself (Smith 2004 ).
Corporate finance also argues that firms should only care about systematic risk, since shareholders can diversify away any unsystematic risk (Brealey and Myers 2003) . However, managers 8 Working Paper, Ross School of Business do exhibit risk averse behavior and cite risk management as a priority (Walls and Dyer 1996, Bickel 2006) . The need for risk management in corporations result from costs of financial distress, differences between cost of external and internal financing and principal-agent problems between shareholders and management (Bickel 2006 ). An approach that is more closely aligned with the risk management motives of avoiding or minimizing the costs of financial distress and external financing is the use of risk measures or mean-risk models to capture the tradeoff between expected value and risk and has its roots in the mean-variance framework for optimal portfolio selection (Markowitz 1952 ).
Since Markowitz (1952) several refinements have been proposed to capture the mean-risk tradeoff more efficiently and overcome the drawbacks associated with the mean-variance approach (it penalizes over-and under-performance equally and excludes stochastically dominant portfolios, for instance). In a seminal paper, Artzner et al. (1999) proposed the theory of coherent risk measures and introduced mean-risk functionals that satisfy properties desirable from the perspective of intuitive decision making. Specifically, coherent risk measures satisfy a) monotonicity, b) subadditivity, c) positive homogeneity and d) translation invariance. Some of the popular risk measures do not necessarily satisfy all the properties required of coherent risk measures, e.g., VaR violates sub-additivity, and variance in a mean-variance criterion violates monotonicity.
The monotonicity and sub-additivity properties of coherent risk measures ensure that using coherent risk measures as a risk-averse objective function is consistent with the use of increasing, concave utility functions under the expected utility approach. In addition, coherent risk measures are also translation invariant and positive homogenous, properties that are not necessarily true for utility functions. Translation invariance implies that initial endowments do not alter risk preferences and hence coherent risk measures provide a good way to quantify the risk inherent in a specific project or the risk from specific decisions. Positive homogeneity ensures that adding same risks together do not reduce the total risk and neither do changing the units of measurement. For these reasons, coherent risk measures suggest themselves as desirable criteria for modeling risk averse decision making at the firm level. A popular coherent risk measure that has been used in finance is Devalkar, Anupindi, CVaR is a downside risk measure that captures payoffs in the worst case scenarios. Generally speaking, CVaR is equal to the conditional expectation of losses above the VaR; e.g., conditional expectation of highest 1% of losses (alternately, lowest 1% of profits). Managers often express risk as only those events associated with negative outcomes (March and Shapira 1987) and a downside risk measure such as CVaR captures these preferences. Increasingly, CVaR has also been used in the OM literature to model risk averse decision making in single period contexts (e.g., Gotoh and Takano (2007) , Chen et al. (2008) , Choi et al. (2009) for newsvendor problems, Tomlin and Wang (2005) , Tomlin (2006) in the context of flexibility and supply disruptions, etc.) Whether using utility functions or risk measures to capture risk aversion, dynamic risk averse decision making also requires incorporating preferences over time. It is known that using expected utility over net present value of wealth leads to a temporal risk problem; i.e., it does not differentiate between alternatives that have the same distribution of terminal wealth, but different times for uncertainty resolution (Smith 1998) . Presumably, a risk-averse decision maker is sensitive to the timing of uncertainty resolution, and not just the distribution of total wealth. One approach used to overcome the temporal risk problem in the utility framework is to model utility over consumption streams rather than incomes and allow borrowing and lending to smooth consumption across time periods. This is the approach followed for instance in Chen et al. (2007) to model dynamic, risk averse decision making. Such an approach requires optimization of consumption, borrowing and lending decisions in addition to the operational decisions and other than for specific utility functions, e.g., additive exponential utility, it is hard to solve the problem and gather insights.
Using static risk measures, i.e., single period risk measures, on the net present value of wealth suffers from a related problem of time inconsistency. That is, the preferences represented by the static measure on the NPV is not consistent over time. To illustrate this, consider the following example adapted from Roorda and Schumacher (2007) . 
Figure 1
Two period investment A in periods 1 and 2, and the probabilities for the different states of the world are as shown on the branches of the tree.
Consider a risk-averse decision maker who needs to make this investment and whose risk aversion can be represented by CVaR at the η = = −1. We can also evaluate CV aR for A at t = 1, conditional on the state realized at t = 1, in a similar manner. , evaluated at t = 0 and t = 1. With the default option of doing nothing (which has a CV aR = 0), 
the decision maker would undertake the investment only if the CV aR value is greater than 0.
The CVaR in period 0 is equal to −1. Thus, A will be deemed unacceptable in period 0. Notice however that the CVaR in all possible states of the world in period 1 is equal to 1. Thus, the same investment would have been considered acceptable in all states of the world in period 1. Notice that there are no cash flows occurring between periods 0 and 1 and there is no discounting. Thus, using a static risk measure such as CVaR can lead to inconsistent decision making.
A Time Consistent Objective Function
The problem of time inconsistency has been considered in the area of mathematical finance and different notions of time consistency that a dynamic risk measure should satisfy have been suggested (Wang (1999) CV aR
where E[·] is the expectation (the expression for CVaR above considers X to denote profits or gains, while the definition in Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) is based on X denoting the losses).
The maximizer υ * in the above problem is unique and equal to V aR 
where S n is the state in period n and H n+1 (S n ) is the set of all possible states in period n + 1 given that the state in period n is S n .
The above definition implies that if a particular cash flow stream, A, is preferred over another, B, in all possible states of the world in the next period, and the cash flow in the current period under A is at least as much as the cash flow under B, then A should be preferred over B in the current period also. In Example 1, we had ρ = (ρ 0 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 ), where ρ n (A, S n ) = CV aR
If we take B as the cashflow stream that has zero payoff in all periods, in all states of the world,
. Thus, CV aR of total cashflow over the remaining horizon is not necessarily a time-consistent risk measure.
We now define a dynamic version of the conditional value at risk, DCV aR( In the above definition, the mean-risk tradeoff evaluated in period n using CV aR is based on the sum of cashflow in the current period A n and the DCV aR n+1 of the cash flow over the remaining periods. Thus, it is the 'risk adjusted' value of the future period cash flows, rather than just the value of the future cash flows, that is taken into account when evaluating the risk over the remaining horizon. As Proposition 1 states, DCV aR(· η) is a time-consistent risk measure (The proofs for all results are provided in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. According to Definition 1, the dynamic risk measure given by equation (2) is time-consistent.
Before continuing, we briefly re-visit Example 1 to illustrate the time-consistent measure. We
Notice that the DCV aR(·) measure accounts for the uncertainty resolved in period 1 in a consistent manner, resulting in DCV aR 0 (A, S 0 ; 2/3) = 1. Thus, using a time-consistent risk measure such as DCV aR will lead to no inconsistency in decision making since the DCV aR in period 0 is equal to 1, thus indicating that A is deemed acceptable in period 0 also. For the integrated operational and financial risk management problem considered in this paper, we use DCV aR, the time-consistent risk measure defined in equation (2) to model the firm's objective.
Model Description and Analysis
We consider the integrated operational and financial risk management problem for a commodity processor who procures, processes and trades commodities over a finite horizon. The time periods are indexed by n = 1, . . . , N with n = 1 denoting the first decision period. In each period n, the firm procures the input commodity from a spot market, where S n denotes the spot price in period n. The firm earns revenues by processing the input and selling the output commodity (processed product) using a forward contract, with the forward price in period n given by F n . We assume the delivery period for the forward contract is period N and period N − 1 is the last period in which the firm can commit to sell the output commodity using the forward contract. In addition to the Working Paper, Ross School of Business output commodity sales, the firm can also earn revenues by trading the input commodity with other processors. For ease of exposition, we assume that all input commodity trading occurs at the end of the horizon, at the trade (salvage) price of S N . Let I n denote the relevant information available to the firm at the beginning of period n regarding the various commodity prices.
On the operational side, the firm has a per-period procurement and processing capacity restriction of K and C units respectively. The firm incurs a variable cost of p to process one unit of input into the output commodity. For simplicity, we assume all physical holding costs for the various commodities are negligible. We first consider the situation when the firm uses only operational decisions, without any trading in the financial markets, to manage the risk. Later, in Section 5.3, we analyze the role of financial hedging decisions for risk management.
Operational Hedging
In the current section, we focus on the optimal procurement, processing and physical commodity trade decisions to manage risk in the commodity processing operations. The output sale commitments require physical delivery of the output commodity on the delivery date and are hence included in the operational decisions.
At the beginning of each period n, the firm observes the input spot price, S n , and the output forward price, F n , for the period. Based on the input commodity inventory, e n , and the uncommitted output commodity inventory, Q n , the firm makes the following decisions: 1) The quantity of input commodity to procure, x n , 2) the quantity to process, m n and 3) the quantity of the output commodity to commit to sale against the forward contract, q n .
The uncommitted output inventory refers to the total output inventory that is in excess (or shortfall) of the total commitments made till the beginning of period n: i.e., Q n = n−1
It is not necessary that Q n ≥ 0, as the firm can commit to sell more output than is available on hand as long as all the output committed for sale against the forward contract is delivered on the delivery date specified in the forward contract, which in our case is period N . Thus, it is not necessary that Q n ≥ 0 for all n < N . However, all commitments made over the horizon have to The procurement and processing decisions in any period are subject to capacity and inventory availability constraints and the feasible set of actions in period n is given by A n (e n ) where
and the state transitions are given by e n+1 = e n + x n − m n and
The profits realized by the firm in period n, for n ≤ N − 1, are given by
where β is the discount factor. In the final period, we have
The profit function in equation (4) above recognizes revenues from output sales at the time of commitment rather than at delivery. Since commodity sale commitments are not reversible and we assume no counter party risk is present, recognizing revenue at the time of commitment rather than at delivery is without loss of generality. As our focus in this research is on managing the commodity price risk, we assume no counter-party risk associated with the buyer of the output commodity. Notice that the profit function for the last period given by equation (5) accounts for the fact that all output sale commitments have to be met on the delivery date for the forward contract.
We model the risk-averse firm's objective function by the time-consistent risk measure DCV aR(·; η), defined in equation (2), on the stream of discounted cashflows. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that the probability levels η are the same across all periods. The firm's risk management problem in period n can then be written as
where we have used the short hand DCV aR η n (·) DCV aR n (·, S n ; η n ) to keep the notation simple.
The fact that DCV aR η n is a time-consistent risk measure ensures that the maximization problem in equation (6) can be solved as a stochastic dynamic program (SDP) as stated below.
Theorem 1. The optimal DCV aR η n of profits from period n till end of the horizon, V n (e n , Q n , I n ) in equation (6), is given by the solution of the following stochastic dynamic program
for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 and
Notice that the objective function in equation (7) is very similar to the objective function in SDP formulations for expected value maximization. However, there are crucial differences. In equation (7), V n+1 is the optimal value of DCV aR n+1 of cash flows over periods n + 1, . . . , N , conditional on I n+ and the starting inventory levels. Thus, V n+1 incorporates the firm's risk aversion over future cash flows and can be thought of as a 'risk adjusted' value of future period cash flows. Evaluated in period n, the 'risk adjusted' value of cash flows over periods n, . . . , N is itself uncertain. The optimization problem incorporates the firm's risk aversion in period n over the 'risk adjusted' value of future cash flows through the CV aR η n term. As mentioned earlier, varying the value of η varies the level of risk aversion and for η = 1, the above problem is the same as expected value maximization. While equation (7) Lemma 1. For all n ≤ N , the value function V n (e n , Q n , I n ) is concave in (e n , Q n ) for each I n and increasing in e n and Q n .
In computations, it is often useful to represent the evolution of the prices as a discrete process, e.g., as lattice models. Such discrete price models have been used for instance by Secomandi (2010) and Jaillet et al. (2004) in the context of risk-neutral commodity trading and option valuation problems. Further, the qualitative insights obtained by considering discrete price processes will hold for the general processes as well. To gain more insights about the dynamic risk management decisions,
we restrict attention to the situation where the price processes follow a discrete distribution and the following assumption holds for the remainder of this paper.
Assumption 1. (Finite price sets). In each period n, the set of possible commodity prices is finite.
The above assumption implies that in each period n, the random variable I n+1 , conditional on I n , has a discrete probability distribution for all n < N . Let M n = (I When prices belong to a finite set, equation (5) can be modified to
where Γ > 0 is sufficiently large to ensure that Q N ≥ 0 under an optimal policy. For instance, we could choose Γ to be a value larger than the maximum possible output forward price across all periods. As a result of this modification, equation (8) becomes
Working Paper, Ross School of Business in the case of discrete prices (there is no change to equation (7)). Theorem 2 establishes an additional property of the value function under Assumption 1. Consider the commitment decision, q n . Recall that the firm can potentially over-commit; i.e., have q n > Q n + m n in any period n < N − 1 as long as it ensures that Q N ≥ 0, as implied by equation (9). The next lemma proves that under mild restrictions on the output forward price process, it is never optimal to commit more than the current output inventory. 
The firm has to satisfy all output commitments before the end of the planning horizon. Thus, any over-commitment made in period n has to be satisfied by processing (and possibly procuring,) additional input in the future periods. Further, any over-commitment in the current period also means a forgone commitment opportunity in the future. Lemma 2 states that the DCV aR of satisfying the over-commitment in terms of the cost of meeting the commitment and/or the forgone future commitment opportunities is higher than the forward price earned by committing the extra unit. Under an optimal policy, we will never have a situation where Q n < 0 for any n.
In general, the optimal procurement, processing and commitment decisions will depend on each other and the starting inventory levels in a non-trivial fashion. For instance, concavity of changes with e n+1 will depend on the joint evolution of the input and output price processes. If the commodity prices satisfy the conditions of Assumption 2 below, we can obtain more insights into the optimal decisions. 
The two conditions stated in Assumption 2 are quite natural. In particular, part (a) of the assumption implies that the expected output forward price in the next period is increasing in the output forward price realized in the current period. Well known models of commodity prices such as the mean-reverting model or geometric Brownian motion models satisfy this condition. The second condition implies that the firm has no speculative motive to hold the output inventory.
Under these conditions, Lemma 3 shows that it is optimal for the firm to commit all available output inventory in any period.
Lemma 3. If the output forward prices satisfy the conditions in Assumption 2, then it is optimal
to commit all the available output inventory. That is, q *
The above result implies that there always exists an optimal policy where all available output inventory is committed. Under such a policy, we will always have Q n = 0 and further, q n = m n for all n. Restricting our attention to only such policies, we do not need to consider the commitment and processing decisions separately. Further, we do not need to carry the output inventory as a state variable since Q n = 0 for all n under such an optimal policy. We can write the SDP formulation in equation (7) as
By Theorem 2, V l n (e n ) is piecewise linear and concave in e n for each I l n ∈ M n , for all n. As a result, the function H l n (e n+1 ) βCV aR l n (V n+1 (e n+1 , I n+1 )) is also piecewise linear and concave in e n+1 for all n < N . We use the piecewise linear nature of the value functions to characterize the optimal procurement and processing decisions next.
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n (e n+1 ); these are the points at which there is a change in slope of H l n (e n+1 ). As the number of possible price realizations are finite in each period, we can use an induction argument to prove that both the number of break points κ(l) + 1 as well as the magnitude b l n (κ(l)) is finite. We can express the ending input inventory for period n in terms of these break points, enabling us to write the optimization problem in equation (10) as a linear program. To see this, for a given e n+1 , define
where
for k = 1, 2, . . . , κ(l) and Υ 
subject to To characterize the optimal solution for the above linear program, we define b n (l) and b n (l) as
The optimal procurement and processing policy is then given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In any period n, for a realization I l n ∈ M n of the prices, there exist two input inventory levels, b n (l) and b n (l) given by equations (16) and (17) respectively, such that the optimal procurement and processing quantities (x * n (l), m * n (l)) are given by
The quantities b n (l) and b n (l) represent input inventory levels above which the marginal riskadjusted value-to-go is less than the processing margin β N −n F n − p and the spot price S n respec-
and the starting input inventory e n can be separated into three regions: a) 0 ≤ e n < b n (l) where it is optimal to procure, b)
where it is optimal to do nothing and c) e n > b n (l) where it is optimal to process. When
there is value from procuring and processing the input immediately since S n < β N −n F n − p. In this case, for input inventory levels e n ≥ b n (l) it is optimal for at least one of the activities, procurement and processing, to be up to capacity.
Determining the target inventory levels requires knowledge of the break points and slopes of 
Approximating the Value Function
We define piecewise linear, concave approximations to V 
we defineV 
To complete the specification, we set
and defineV Notice that equation (21) 1) and thereby obtain the heuristic operational policy. We will test the performance of this heuristic policy numerically in Section 6.2.
Role of Financial Instruments
As discussed in the introduction and motivation for this research, the growth of commodity exchanges provides firms with additional options to manage the risk from commodity procurement Working Paper, Ross School of Business and processing operations. For instance, commodity futures are used extensively by oilseed processors and grain elevators to manage risk in their operations (see Soyatech 2008 , Plato 2001 . In this section, we consider a firm that maximizes the DCV aR of cash flows over the horizon where the cash flows are a result of both operational and financial activities. Thus, the firm's problem in each period n is still described as in equation (6). However, the profits in each period Π n now include the proceeds from financial trading activity.
In the problem considered here, all output inventory is traded using forward contracts and no counter party risks are assumed. If well traded financial instruments exist for the output commodity, it is possible to perfectly replicate the revenues from output sale commitments and the firm can completely hedge the risk from the output commodity. For instance, when interest rates and commodity price changes are not correlated, the forward prices will coincide with traded futures prices for the commodity (see Hull 1997, Chap. 3) . On the other hand, the input commodity is procured from local spot markets. Further, any input inventory left at the end of the horizon is salvaged / traded. While the spot market and salvage prices may be correlated with the prices of financial derivatives on the input commodity, they are usually not perfectly correlated. Thus, it
is of considerable interest to analyze how the firm can use the financial instruments for the input commodity, along with its operational decisions to manage the commodity risk. For the rest of the section, we shall restrict attention to the set of financial instruments available for the input commodity.
Let j = 1, 2, . . . , J index the financial instruments available for the input commodity and H n = (H 1n , . . . , H Jn ) indicate the firm's position in these instruments at the beginning of period n. We assume that all of the financial positions of the firm are marked to market in each period; that is, at the end of each period the loss or gain in the value of the firm's financial position is assessed and the value of the financial portfolio reset to the current period value (see Hull 1997, Chap. 2) . Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that the firm liquidates its financial positions each period and decides on the positions for the next period. Let Θ n = (θ 1n , θ 2n , . . . , θ Jn ) denote the vector of payoffs for these financial instruments in period n (For example, the payoff in period n on a futures 
Using an induction argument, we can show that V l n (e n , H n ) is separable in e n and H n and can
The next theorem states for each I n ∈ M n , conditional on the optimal financial hedging decisions, U l n (e n ) can be computed without knowing the optimal hedging decision, H * n+1 , explicitly.
Theorem 4. The optimal procurement and processing decisions, conditional on optimal financial hedging decisions being made, are given by the solution to the following SDP:
subject to
and p (26) for the resulting ending input inventory and obtain the optimal position in financial instrument j as the dual variable to the j th constraint in (28). While information exchange between operational and financial trading divisions is necessary for efficient risk management, it is sufficient that operations only needs to know the set of financial instruments traded, and the financial trading division only needs to know the ending input inventory.
Numerical Study
In this section, we illustrate the analytical results developed in Section 5 through numerical experiments. The main goals of the numerical experiments are to 1) study the performance of the heuristic developed in Section 5.2, 2) illustrate the benefit of consistent decision making by comparing the performance of a time-consistent risk measure with that of static risk measure on the terminal wealth and 3) quantify the benefit of integrated operational and financial hedging compared to only operational hedging.
Implementation
We model the input spot price as a single factor, mean-reverting process as in Schwartz (1997) , while the output forward price is modeled as a driftless geometric Brownian motion with exponentially decreasing volatility (consistent with a mean-reverting price process for the spot price). Specifically, S i (t), the spot price of the input at time t is modeled as ln S i (t) = χ i (t) + µ(t), where χ i (t) is the logarithm of the deseasonalized price and µ(t) is a deterministic factor which captures the seasonality in spot prices. The deseasonalized price χ i (t) follows a mean-reverting process given
where κ i is the mean-reversion coefficient, ξ i is the long run The output forward price F (t, T ) is given by F (t, T ) = e µ f (T )F (t, T ) where µ f (t) is a deterministic factor to capture the seasonality in output prices andF (t, T ) is the deseasonalized output forward price with dynamics
dW f (t). The Brownian motion increments underlying the input and output prices have a constant correlation, ρ. We discretize the input spot and output forward prices and represent the joint evolution of the prices as a multi-dimensional, recombining binomial tree (cf., Peterson and Stapleton (2002) for details on approximating the joint evolution of correlated price processes). The parameters underlying the dynamics of the price processes were estimated based on the soybean, soymeal and soyoil futures prices information for contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). For the purposes of the numerical study in this paper, we model a single composite output, instead of two individual outputs -meal and oil. The parameters for the composite output are estimated by combining the prices of the soymeal and oil in the proportion in which they are produced upon processing one unit of the input commodity.
Such approximations of multiple commodities as a single, composite product have been used in the context of valuing basket options (see Borovkova et al. 2007 , for instance) and are sufficient to illustrate the main goals of the numerical study, namely the benefit of time-consistent decision making. The estimated parameters for the price processes of the input and output commodity are given in Table 2 .
For all the numerical studies, we set the variable cost of processing p to equal 72 cents / bushel, which corresponds to about 35% of the gross margin from processing one bushel of soybean, based on the long run average prices of the three commodities. This value of the processing cost is close to the average processing costs estimated for the US soybean processing industry (Soyatech 2008 ).
The procurement and processing capacities K and C, were set to 5 and 3 units respectively. These capacities can be considered to be in multiples of bushels, e.g., million bushels. We assume all holding costs are negligible and normalize them to zero, and no discounting, i.e., β = 1.
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Performance of Heuristic
The heuristic described in Section 5.2 is based on approximating the optimal value-to-go function by a piecewise linear, concave function with breaks at integral multiples of D. The approximation helps to make the computation tractable by ensuring that the break points ofV n for all n occur only at integral multiples of D. Notice that the statement of Theorem 3 will still be true if the optimal value-to-go function was approximated by a piecewise linear, concave function with breaks at integral multiples of D/2 m , where m is any positive integer; i.e., following the approximation procedure will ensure that the break points ofV n for all n will occur only at integral multiples of D/2 m . As m increases, the approximation will capture all the break points in the optimal value function and the heuristic value computed using the approximation will converge to the optimal value as m → ∞.
We measure the incremental improvement in the heuristic value as m increases. That is, let LB η n (m) be the DCV aR value of total profits at the η level for a n period problem when using The results reported in Figures 4 and 5 were generated using the price process parameters given in processor and 2 GB RAM, running Windows Vista Enterprise operating system).
Benefits of Financial Hedging
We evaluate the benefit of integrating financial trading, in addition to operational decisions, as part of the risk management process. We consider a single financial instrument, a futures contract with maturity at the end of the horizon, and illustrate the benefits of trading the futures contract.
Clearly, having the additional option to trade the futures instrument will improve the DCV aR of total profits. Intuitively, using the financial instrument to hedge uncertainty in future period cash flows should also enable the firm to make operational decisions that will maximize the expected value of total profits. Figure 6 shows the tradeoff between the expected total profits and the DCV aR α of total profits for α = 0.05 and α = 0.10 with and without financial trading. As seen in the figure, integrating financial trading as part of the risk management strategy clearly has benefits for the firm in terms of increased expected profits for the same amount of risk undertaken.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the dynamic operational and financial risk management for a commodity processing firm. We proposed a model to capture the firm's risk aversion using a time consistent, dynamic risk measure based on CVaR. We characterized the optimal operational policies and showed that the procurement and processing decisions in any period are governed by price dependent 'procure up to' and 'process down to' input inventory thresholds. Further, we showed that in the presence of optimal financial hedging, these thresholds can be obtained Figure 6 Value of Financial Hedging: Mean-DCVaR profiles of total profits with and without financial hedging without knowing the details of the financial hedging decisions themselves. We developed an efficient heuristic to compute the optimal operational and financial decisions and using numerical studies showed that these heuristics are near optimal. Using numerical studies, we showed that using the optimal policies obtained from a time consistent objective function provide a better mean-CVaR tradeoff for the total profits, compared to those obtained when using the CVaR of the total profits as the objective function. In addition, we found that using a time consistent risk measure also minimizes the probability of extreme losses over the entire horizon.
Our work is one of the few early attempts to model the dynamic risk management problem for firms dealing with storable commodities. While we have considered a firm that maximizes a dynamic risk measure, many commodity trading and processing firms think of risk control in terms of constraints. That is, they are interested in maximizing expected profits over the horizon, while imposing limits on the total risk that can be taken, where risk is measured using a risk measure such as CVaR or variance. This is the approach taken in Kleindorfer and Li (2005) , for instance.
Exploring the issue of time consistency in such dynamic risk constrained optimization problems will be an interesting area for future research. Further, the context of the problem can be expanded to include multiple input / output commodity sets where the firm has a choice to decide which input to procure and process or what output to produce and the impact of these options on risk management. 
where the inequality follows from the fact that CV aR η is a coherent risk measure and therefore monotonic. Thus, DCV aR(·; η) given by equation (2) is time consistent.
Proof of Theorem 1: From equation (6) and the definition of DCV aR η n given in equation (2), we have 
Proof of Lemma 1:
The proof follows from a standard induction argument. Clearly, the statement is true for n = N . Suppose it is true for all t = n + 1, . . . , N . The set (e n , Q n , x n , m n , q n ) : e n ∈ R + , Q n ∈ R, q n ≥ 0, (x n , m n ) ∈ A n (e n ) is convex. Further, since CV aR η is a coherent risk measure, it is concave and therefore the maximand in equation (7) is concave in (x n , m n , q n , e n , Q n ). Thus, from Proposition B-4 in Heyman and Sobel (1984) , V n (e n , Q n , I n ) is concave in (e n , Q n ) for each I n . The increasing part is straightforward to prove using similar induction arguments.
We state and prove a lemma that will be used in many of the subsequent proofs. where p (l,m) is the transition probability from I By linearity of the objective function in q o , we will always have q o = 0 or q o = ∞ at optimality in the inner maximization problem above. Since the optimal value for the overall problem is finite and bounded, the optimal choice of ψ will be such that q o = 0 at optimality. Hence, over-commitment is never optimal.
Notice that As the induction assumption, for all t ≥ n + 1, let V 
